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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how institutional investors interact with sell-side analysts (hereafter, SSAs) in Korean stock 
market. In particular, we examine the role of institutional investors as a more sophisticated mechanism which 
incorporates sell-side analysts’ stock recommendation, target price, and earnings forecast more rapidly than 
individual investors do. Moreover, we examine whether institutional investors differentiate the quality of sell-side 
analysts’ information. By using a sample of 1,421 firm-year observations in Korean stock market during 2001–2011, 
we find that the change of institutional investor’s ownership has a significantly positive association with the level of 
equity value estimates based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts relative to stock prices and their stock recommendation 
which are considered as SSAs’ indicator of stock market’s mispricing. In addition, we find that only when SSAs provide 
more accurate earnings forecasts, institutional investors incorporate SSA’s information into their stock trading. Thus, 
we conclude that institutional investors in Korean stock market contribute to the enhancement of stock market 
efficiency by incorporating SSAs’ information into their stock trading more rapidly than individual investors. Our 
findings add to the literature by shedding a light on the unobserved interaction among more sophisticated stock market 
participants, such as institutional investors and sell-side analysts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines how institutional investors interact with sell-side analysts (hereafter, SSAs) in 
Korean stock market. Lee (2001) suggests that stock prices converge toward the intrinsic value of equity 
over time, and that convergence is achieved only at substantial social costs. Therefore, a temporary 
divergence between stock price and intrinsic value of equity is inevitable. Thus, given that efficient stock markets is 
a necessary condition for the economically efficient allocation of social resources among firms, it is important to 
identify which factors either facilitate or impede stock price convergence toward intrinsic value of equity.  
 
Prior studies suggest that SSAs’ information, such as earnings forecasts, target prices, and stock recommendations, 
can predict future stock returns (e.g., Frankel & Lee, 1998; Lee, Myers, & Swaminathan, 1999; Cha & Yoo, 2010). 
Their results imply that SSAs provide value relevant information that can facilitate stock price convergence toward 
intrinsic value of equity. However, SSAs, as information intermediary, cannot accelerate stock price convergence 
toward intrinsic value of equity by themselves. Thus, there must be some stock market participants who actually trade 
stocks incorporating SSAs’ information. Given that SSAs’ information has the potential to enhance stock market 
efficiency, it is important to examine which market participants incorporate it more actively than the others. Prior 
studies suggest that institutional investors outperform individual investors and that their stock trading leads to 
subsequent stock returns (e.g., Nofsinger & Sias, 1999; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). Therefore, we focus on the role 
of institutional investors as the stock market participants who more actively incorporate SSAs’ information.   
 
In prior literature, the roles of sell-side analysts and institutional investors on the enhancement of stock market 
efficiency are separately examined. However, the interaction between SSAs and institutional investors is not fully 
investigated. Although Chen & Cheng (2006) and Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012) find that a change in 
institutional ownership is positively correlated with SSAs’ stock recommendations, they do not examine whether 
T 
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institutional investors incorporate more comprehensive set of SSAs’ information, such as earnings forecasts, target 
prices as well as stock recommendations. Furthermore, there is a paucity of evidence on whether institutional investors 
consider the quality of SSA’s information when incorporating it into their stock trading. This study attempts to fill 
such a void in the literature.  
 
More specifically, we examine the association between the change of institutional ownership and SSAs’ indicator of 
stock market’s mispricing, such as equity value estimate based on their earnings forecasts relative to stock price 
(hereafter, V/P ratio), target price relative to stock price, and stock recommendation. If institutional investors 
incorporate SSAs’ indicators of stock mispricing more rapidly than individual investors, there will be positive 
associations between institutional ownership and SSAs’ mispricing indicators. If it is the case, we can suggest that 
institutional investors take more active role in incorporating SSAs’ value relevant information into stock price and 
that they act as a more sophisticated mechanism to enhance stock market efficiency. In addition, to support the causal 
relationship between SSAs’ information and institutional ownership, we examine whether institutional investors’ 
trading behavior affects SSAs’ information as an alternative hypothesis for the association between institutional 
ownership and SSAs’ mispricing indicators.  
 
On the other hand, we examine whether institutional investors selectively incorporate more accurate SSAs’ 
information into their stock trading. Prior literature indicates that SSAs’ information is not free from bias and noise 
although SSAs’ information is useful for the prediction of future stock returns. For example, Irvine (2004) suggests 
that SSAs provide optimistically biased information. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) and Kim and Eum (2006) 
suggest that SSAs who work for brokerage houses update earnings forecasts timely but slowly, and that they 
downgrade their stock recommendations slowly to “Hold” or “Sell” and upgrade them promptly to “Buy”. 
Furthermore, Bradshaw (2004) suggest that SSAs’ stock recommendation is not consistent with the V/P ratio, which 
is considered as a mispricing indicator based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts. Thus, it is important to investigate whether 
institutional investors, as a more sophisticated mechanism to enhance stock market efficiency by actively 
incorporating SSAs’ information, can distinguish the quality of SSAs’ information. Loh and Mian (2006) suggest that 
as SSAs’ earnings forecasts are more accurate, the returns from stock trading based SSAs’ stock recommendation are 
higher. A survey by Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2006) indicates that buy-side analysts are more dependent on SSAs’ 
earnings forecasts when they are more accurate. Thus, in this paper, we examine whether institutional investors 
incorporate more actively SSAs’ information as SSAs’ earnings forecasts are more accurate.  
 
Using a sample of 1,421 firm-year observations in Korean stock market during 2001 and 2011, we find that the change 
of institutional investor’s ownership has a significantly positive association with the level of equity value estimates 
based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts relative to stock prices (V/P ratio) as well as SSAs’ stock recommendations. This 
result indicates that institutional investors increase their equity ownership for the firms to which SSAs issue more 
favorable information. That is, institutional investors incorporate SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing into 
their stock trading more rapidly than individual investors do, which in turn suggests that institutional investors take a 
more active role in incorporating SSA’s information into stock prices. To the contrary, we find that SSAs’ information 
is not affected by institutional investors’ trading behavior. Therefore, we can conclude that our main results support 
the causality relationship in which institutional investors trade stocks incorporating SSAs’ information, but not vice 
versa. Lastly, we find that the change of institutional investor’s ownership has a significantly positive association with 
SSAs’ information only when SSAs provide relatively more accurate earnings forecasts. This result indicates that 
institutional investors can distinguish the quality of SSAs’ information, which also supports that institutional investors 
act as a more sophisticated mechanism to enhance stock market efficiency.  
 
This study makes important contributions to the literature as follows. First, this study provides a piece of important 
evidence that institutional investors act as a more sophisticated mechanism in incorporating SSAs’ value relevant 
information more rapidly than individual investors do. This evidence adds to the prior literature which examines 
institutional investors’ sophistication in stock market. Second, this study indicates that institutional investors can 
differentiate the quality of SSAs’ information. Overall, this study contributes to the enhancement of our knowledge 
about the unobserved interaction among more sophisticated stock market participants, such as sell-side analysts and 
institutional investors.  
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The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews prior studies and develops hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our research method and sample selection. Section 4 reports the empirical findings and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
This study examines the interaction between institutional investors, who are the most sophisticated stock traders, and 
sell-side analysts, who are the most prominent information intermediaries in the stock market. The role of institutional 
investors and/or SSAs on stock market efficiency is established by prior studies.  
 
A stream of research examines whether sell-side analysts can contribute to the enhancement of stock market efficiency. 
First, prior literature investigates whether SSAs’ earnings forecasts can provide value relevant information to stock 
markets. For example, Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1987) suggest that SSAs’ earnings forecasts are 
superior to the univariate time-series models of previous earnings on the accuracy of future earnings prediction. Stickel 
(1991) suggest that analysts’ earnings forecast revision improves the return from stock trading strategy, and Gleason 
and Lee (2003) find that additional analyst coverage facilitates faster stock price adjustment to analysts’ forecast 
revision. While Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer (2001) suggest that the ratio of stock price to analysts’ earnings forecast 
predicts future stock returns, Lee et al. (1999) suggest that equity value estimates based on analysts’ earnings forecast 
rather than historical earnings are better predictors of future stock prices. Frankel and Lee (1998) also indicate that 
equity value estimates, based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts, relative to stock prices (V/P ratio) can predict future stock 
returns. Furthermore, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) suggest that the effect of “V/P ratio” reported by Frankel and 
Lee (1998) is derived by stock market’s mispricing rather than by omitted risk factors. Cha and Yoo (2010) also find 
that SSAs’ earnings forecasts can predict future stock returns in Korean stock market.  
 
Second, numerous studies examine the future stock return predictability of SSAs’ stock recommendation. Womack 
(1996) finds that SSAs’ upgrades and downgrades of their stock recommendation can predict future stock returns. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) also find that SSAs’ upgraded stock recommendations are associated with positive future 
stock returns. Barber et al. (2001) conclude that the strategy to buy stocks with “strong buy” recommendation leads 
to positive abnormal stock returns.  
 
Third, prior literature examines whether SSAs’ target price also contains value relevant information to predict future 
stock return. Brav and Lehavy (2003) find that stock market reacts to SSAs’ revision of their target prices. Asquith, 
Mikhail, and Au (2005) find that SSAs’ target price revisions can explain variations of stock prices. Bianchini, Bonini, 
Salvi, and Zanitti (2008) and Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang (2013) conclude that SSAs’ target price and its change are 
positively associated with future stock return. Kim and Eum (2006) also find that information provided by SSAs, such 
as stock recommendation and target price revision, significantly affects stock prices in Korean stock market.  
 
On the other hand, prior studies suggest that institutional investors are more sophisticated investors in the stock market 
and so their trading strategy predicts future stock returns. Institutional investors are better at analyzing and 
understanding information than individual investors, because institutional investors can access company information 
more easily and monitor management at a lower cost than individual investors (Kang & Stulz 1997; Barber & Odean 
2008). Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) find that the extent to which stock prices lead earnings is 
positively associated with institutional ownership. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutional investors almost 
doubled their stock shares from 1980 to 1996, and that the level of institutional ownership can help estimate future 
stock returns due to the compositional shift in ownership towards institutional investors. In addition, Yan and Zhang 
(2009) suggest that the association between institutional predictive ability and abnormal stock return, suggested by 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), is derived from short-term institutional investors. Sias, Starks, and Titman (2001) find 
that institutional investors lead the stock returns and perform better than individual ones, while Odean (1999) suggests 
that individual investors’ portfolios do not outperform the market benchmark. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) also find that 
positive association between annual change in institutional ownership and stock returns over herding interval is 
contrary to change in individual ownership. Furthermore, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) suggest that institutional 
investors choose more attractive stocks, whereas individual investors are eager to cash out on winning stocks, in 
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Finland’s stock market. Bae and Park (2007) find a significantly positive association between institutional ownership 
and subsequent stock returns in Korean stock market, and Kim and Cheon (2004) also find that foreign and domestic 
institutional investors acquire positive stock returns with superior information advantage.  
 
To the extent that institutional investors perform better than individual investors do in stock market, it is important to 
investigate which factor in stock market cause a superior sophistication of institutional investors. While prior studies 
suggest that the superior sophistication of institutional investor is determined by herding or momentum trading 
strategy (e.g., Wermers, 1999; Chen, Jegadeesh, & Wermers, 2000), there is limited research on whether a closer 
interaction between institutional investors and SSAs can lead to the superior sophistication of institutional investors.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
As described in previous section, prior literature suggests that sell-side analysts’ summary information, such as 
earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices, provide stock investors with useful information to predict 
future stock returns. That is, SSAs’ forecasting information has a potential to enhance the efficiency of stock market. 
However, SSAs cannot accelerate the convergence of stock price toward its intrinsic value by themselves, because 
SSAs just provide stock market participants with information to guide their actual trading. Thus, to make it possible 
that SSAs’ information actually facilitate the convergence of stock price into its intrinsic value, some investors, who 
actually trade stocks incorporating SSAs’ information, should play a role. That is, investors’ execution of SSAs’ trading 
guidance is essential for SSAs’ information to enhance the stock market efficiency. In this study, we focus on the role 
of institutional investors as more sophisticated stock market participants who incorporate more actively SSAs’ value 
relevant information.  
 
One of the distinct channels of the interaction between SSAs and institutional investors can be described as follows. 
SSAs receive, process information from diverse sources, communicating it first with institutional investors in concise 
forms, such as earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices. Then, subsequently, institutional investors 
incorporate such information into their stock trading more rapidly.1 Anecdotal evidence also shows that the main 
resources of institutional investors’ equity research are provided by brokerage and investment banking firms with 
SSAs in exchange for a trading commission (Irvine, 2004; Cheng et al. 2006). In practice, institutional investors and 
SSAs have regular lunch meetings or conference calls. Furthermore, SSAs participate in investor relation meetings 
and meet firm’s management together with institutional investors. Thus, those institutional investors may spend more 
time to analyze the company itself and/or related industry in-depth, which is covered by SSAs (Cheng et al. 2006).  
 
Therefore, we expect that institutional investors are likely to incorporate SSAs’ information more rapidly than 
individual investors do. If institutional investors incorporate SSAs’ indicators of mispricing more rapidly than 
individual investors, there will be positive associations between institutional ownership and analysts’ indicators of 
stock market’s mispricing, such as V/P ratio, target price, and stock recommendations. Thus, our first hypothesis is as 
follows.  
 
H1: There is a positive association between the change of institutional investors’ ownership and sell-side analysts’ 
indicators of stock market’s mispricing (V/P ratios, target prices, stock recommendations). 
 
Sell-side analysts have conflicts of interest and so provide optimistically biased earnings forecasts (Irvine, 2004). 
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) and Kim and Eum (2006) suggest that SSAs’ revision of stock recommendation 
is also optimistically biased. Furthermore, Bradshaw (2004) suggest that SSAs provide inconsistent information 
between earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Thus, as a necessary condition that institutional investors can 
enhance stock market efficiency by incorporating SSAs’ information into their stock trading, they should be able to 
selectively incorporate more accurate SSAs’ information into their stock trading. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
investigates whether institutional investors are likely to incorporate SSAs’ information more actively into their stock 
trading as SSAs provide more accurate forecast information. Given that institutional investors perform better than 
                                                             
1While it can be alternatively argued that institutional investors may depends on information from buy-side analysts, Groysberg, Healy, and Serafeim 
(2013) suggest that buy-side analysts cover more stocks than SSAs, and that buy-side analysts report less accurate, less informative, and more 
biased information than SSAs do. 
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individual investors do in stock market, we expect that institutional investors can distinguish the quality of SSAs’ 
information. Loh and Mian (2006) suggest that as SSAs’ earnings forecasts are more accurate, the returns from stock 
trading based SSAs’ stock recommendation are higher. Thus, we expect that institutional investors incorporate more 
actively SSAs’ information than individual investors as SSAs’ earnings forecasts are more accurate. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is as follows.  
 
H2: There is a stronger positive association between the change of institutional investors’ ownership and sell-side 
analysts’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing (V/P ratios, target prices, stock recommendations) as analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are more accurate. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
3.1 Measurement of Sell-Side Analysts’ Indicators of Stock Market’s Mispricing  
 
In this study, we consider SSAs’ earnings forecasts, target prices and stock recommendations as the summary 
information which institutional investors incorporate into their stock trading. More specifically, we examine the 
association between the change of institutional ownership and SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing based on 
such information. The measurement of SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing from target price and stock 
recommendation is very straightforward. We use the ratio of target price to stock price, and the score from stock 
recommendations (i.e., higher score indicates stronger recommendation to buy stocks) as the SSAs’ mispricing 
indicators. However, SSAs’ indicators of mispricing from earnings forecasts are not explicitly observable. Prior 
research suggests that equity value estimates based on SSAs’ earnings forecast relative to stock price (V/P ratio) can 
predict future stock return (Frankel & Lee, 1998; Ali et al. 2003; Cha & Yoo, 2010). Because SSAs’ earnings forecasts 
are the most important input into the measurement of V/P ratio, their results imply that V/P ratio can be considered as 
the SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing based on their earnings forecasts. Thus, we use V/P ratio as the 
proxy of such an indicator from SSAs’ earnings forecasts. For all of SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s mispricing, a 
higher (lower) value of each indicator implies investors’ underpricing (overpricing) of stocks.  
 
To convert SSAs’ earnings forecasts into equity value estimate, which is necessary to measure V/P ratio, we consider 
two representative implementations of residual income valuation model (e.g., Liu, Nissim, and Thomas, 2002).2 
Accounting researchers use the residual income valuation (RIV) model because it links equity value to the firm’s 
accounting information with the clean surplus relation (Ohlson, 1995). The RIV model approach is that the equity 
value of the firm is the sum of current book value of equity and the present value of the future residual incomes. To 
estimate future residual income, we use one-, and two-year ahead SSAs’ earnings forecasts as the inputs. Then, we 
apply the representative assumptions in prior literature to estimate the residual income beyond two years ahead. The 
first RIV model (VRIVC) assumes that the residual earnings remain constant after two years ahead (Frankel & Lee, 
1998; Lee et al. 1999; Liu et al. 2002; Ali et al. 2003; Jorgensen et al. 2011). We compute future book values by using 
clean surplus relation in which the book value of equity in the future year equals the beginning of book value of equity 
and the estimated earnings, less the estimated dividends. We compute the cost of equity capital based on Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM):  
 𝑉"#$% = 𝑏𝑣) + ∑ ,-.(012.3456.×89.34:;)(=>6.)4 ?@2A= + -.(012.3B56.×89.3;)6.×(=>6.)B  (1) 
 
where bvt is the book value per share at year t; epst are the earnings per share during year t; and rt is the cost of equity 
capital during year t.  
 
The second RIV model (VRIVI) assumes that firm’s profitability, measured by return on equity (ROE), trends linearly 
from the level computed from SSAs’ two-year-ahead earnings forecasts into the industry median of return on equity 
by the 12th year, and after 12th year the residual income is constant. Following Liu et al. (2002), we winsorize the 
                                                             
2We consider equity value estimates derived from the residual income valuation model (VRIVC and VRIVI) because Jorgensen et al. (2011) suggest 
that the accuracy of equity value estimates from the alternative earnings based valuation model, i.e., abnormal earnings growth model is lower. In 
a sensitivity test, we also use V/P ratios based on abnormal earnings growth model (Gode & Mohanram, 2003; Easton, 2004), and the untabulated 
result is qualitatively similar.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2018 Volume 34, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 460 The Clute Institute 
median of return on equity in the industry at the risk free rate and 20%:  
 𝑉"#$# = 𝑏𝑣) + ∑ ,-.(012.3456.×89.34:;)(=>6.)4 ?@2A= 	+ ∑ [-.("E-.3456.)]×89.34:;(=>6.)4==2AG + [-.("E-.3;B56.)]×89.3;;6.×(=>6.);;  (2) 
 
where ROEt is the return on equity during year t. 
 
Then, we calculate the ratio of equity value estimate from each implementation to stock price (VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P). In 
addition, to reduce potential measurement errors, we calculate the third V/P ration by taking the average of VRIVC/P 
and VRIVI/P (VAVER/P).  
 
3.2 Regression Equation 
 
To examine our hypotheses, we use the change of institutional ownership as the dependent variable, and SSAs’ 
indicators of stock market’s mispricing (V/P ratio, target price, and stock recommendation) as independent variables. 
More specifically, our main regression equation is as follows.  
 ∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇	 = 𝛽N + 𝛽=	𝑉"#$%/𝑃(𝑉"#$#/𝑃, 𝑉R$-"/𝑃) + 𝛽@𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽G𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀+𝛽Z𝐼𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸	 + 𝛽]𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷	 + 𝛽a𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴+ 𝛽c𝐼𝑛𝐵/𝑀 + 𝛽d𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 +𝛽e𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽=N𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑅𝐸𝑇12+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (3) 
 
where ∆INSTIT is a change in institutional ownership for a year after the SSAs’ information is disclosed at the 
beginning of year; VRIVC/P are the equity value estimates, which is inferred from RIVC model, scaled by stock price at 
the beginning of the year; VRIVI/P are the equity value estimates, which is inferred from RIVI model, scaled by stock 
price at the beginning of the year; VAVER/P is the average of VRIVC/P and VRIVI/P; TARGET is the SSAs’ target price 
divided by the stock price at the beginning of year; RECOM is the SSAs’ stock recommendation at the beginning of 
year (1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Sell, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, and 5 = Strong Buy); lnSIZE is the natural log of the market value 
of equity; YIELD is the dividend per share divided by stock price at the beginning of year; BETA is the systematic risk 
estimated by regressing 30 prior monthly stock return and up to 60 prior monthly returns against the corresponding 
market index; lnB/M is the natural log of ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity; LEVERAGE is total 
liability divided by total assets; VOLUME is the average of the ratio of daily trading volume divided by the number 
of shares outstanding; lagRET12 is the stock return of each firm during the previous year; Year Dummies are year 
indicators; Industry Dummies are industry indicators based on the two-digit industry code.  
 
We use the change in institutional ownership (∆INSTIT) for a year after the SSAs’ information is disclosed at the 
beginning of year as dependent variable. As independent variables, we use VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, and VAVER/P. We also 
include SSAs’ target prices divided by stock prices (TARGET) and stock recommendations (RECOM) at the beginning 
of the year as additional independent variables. We use stock recommendations from the majority of Korean brokerage 
houses and classify them into five categories: “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” “Hold,” “Sell,” and “Strong Sell,” with values 
ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Sell, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, and 5 = Strong Buy), respectively. Because a higher 
(lower) value of SSAs’ mispricing indicator implies investors’ underpricing (overpricing) of stocks, if institutional 
investors incorporate SSAs’ mispricing indicators more rapidly than individual investors, there will be a positive 
association between the change of institutional ownerships and SSAs’ mispricing indicators. 
 
To analyze the association between the change in institutional ownership and SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s 
mispricing, we should control for the other factors that might affect the change of institutional ownership.  Prior 
research finds various stock characteristics, which affect institutional investors’ stock trading (e.g., Gompers & 
Metrick, 2001; Chen & Cheng, 2006). Institutional investors prefer the stocks with lower volatility of stock price and 
higher dividend yields, because they are restricted to the prudence of fiduciary regulation, while they prefer more 
liquid and larger stocks because of richer information environment and lower transaction cost (Gompers & Metrick, 
2001). Thus, we include market beta (BETA), dividend yield (YIELD), firm size (lnSIZE), and turnover (VOLUME) 
as control variables. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) suggest that institutional investors are more likely to invest in glamour 
than value stocks, because it is short to earn intended positive stock returns by investing in value stocks. Thus, we add 
book to market ratio (lnB/M) as control variable. Prior studies also find that institutional investors buy stocks with 
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positive momentum (Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers, 1995; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004), and so we include 
previous year’s stock return (lagRET12). We also add leverage (LEVERAGE) as control variable because institutional 
investors’ ownership is negatively related to the level of leverage (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994). Lastly, our regression 
model includes year and industry dummy variables to control for the variability of the change in institutional 
ownership across year and industry.  
 
On the other hand, to support the causal relationship between SSAs’ information and institutional ownership, we 
examine whether institutional investors’ trading behavior affects SSAs’ information as an alternative hypothesis for 
the association between the change of institutional ownership and SSAs’ mispricing indicators. To address this 
empirical issue, we regress the changes in SSAs’ mispricing indicators on the change in institutional investor’s 
ownership for the previous year. Following Ali et al. (2003), we control for the well-known risk proxies since the 
change of V/P ratios may be affected by various risk factors as follows.  
 ∆𝑉"#$%𝑃 v∆𝑉"#$#𝑃 , ∆𝑉R$-"𝑃 , ∆𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀w = 𝛽N + 𝛽=𝑙𝑎𝑔∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇 +𝛽@𝐼𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽G𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴+ 𝛽Z𝐼𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 + 𝛽]𝑂𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽a𝐼𝑛𝐵/𝑀+𝛽c𝐼𝑛𝐷/𝑀 +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 (4) 
 
where ∆VRIVC/P are the change of equity value estimates, which is inferred from RIVC model, scaled by stock price 
during the year; ∆VRIVI/P are the change of equity value estimates, which is inferred from RIVI model, scaled by stock 
price during the year; ∆VAVER/P is the change of the average of VRIVC/P and VRIVI/P during the year; ∆TARGET is the 
change of SSAs’ target price divided by the stock price during the year; ∆RECOM is the change of SSAs’ stock 
recommendation during the year; lag∆INSTIT is the change in institutional ownership during the previous year; lnSIZE 
is the natural log of the market value of equity; BETA is the systematic risk estimated by regressing 30 prior monthly 
stock return and up to 60 prior monthly returns against the corresponding market index; IDRISK is the idiosyncratic 
risk, measured as the variance of residuals from the regressions of BETA estimation; OIVOL is the standard deviation 
of operating income during the past two to five years, scaled by average total asset; lnB/M is the natural log of ratio 
of book value of equity to market value of equity; lnD/M is the natural log of ratio of book value of debt to market 
value of equity; Year Dummies are year indicators; Industry Dummies are industry indicators based on the two-digit 
industry code.  
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of Korean firms from 2001 to 2011, which excludes the observations from 
2008. This is because only few SSAs revised their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations during the global 
financial crisis in 2008, that is, SSAs in Korea did not play their role as information intermediaries in 2008 (Song & 
Byun, 2013).3 We extract accounting and stock return data from the Korea Information Service Value (KisValue) 
database, institutional ownership, analysts’ earnings forecast, target prices and stock recommendations data from the 
Fn-Guide database.4 We also use the three-year government bond rate as a proxy for risk-free rate to calculate cost of 
equity capital from the Economic Statistics System of the Bank of Korea. We select firm-year observations that satisfy: 
 
(1) financial statement data, which is required for computation of the main variables, industry identification 
codes, and stock return data are available from KisValue;  
(2) stock price, analysts’ information, institutional ownerships are available from Fn-Guide;  
(3) non-financial firm;  
(4) fiscal year-end is December;  
(5) book value of equity is positive. 
 
This process yields a final sample of 1,421 firm-year observations from KSE/KOSDAQ listing firms between 2001 
and 2011. This final sample is used for the descriptive statistics in Table 1.5 
                                                             
3 As a sensitivity test, we rerun our main empirical analyses after including the observations from 2008. The main result remains constant.  
4 Because Fn-Guide provides analysts data from 2001 and institutional ownership data until 2011, our sample period is restricted to such a period.  
5 To mitigate the effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at 5% and 95% of the pooled distributions.  
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics of our sample are reported in Table 1. The mean values of VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, VAVER/P are 1.571, 
2.113, and 1.854, respectively. These results are consistent with previous study (Cha & Yoo, 2010). The mean value 
of TARGET is 1.209, which indicates that SSAs evaluate the stock price as undervalued by 21% on average. The 
average of ROCOM (3.701) suggests that SSAs encourage investors to buy the stock on average. This is also consistent 
with prior studies (Kho & Kim, 2007; Cha & Yoo, 2010), which suggest that SSAs’ stock recommendations are 
optimistically biased in Korean stock market. Although all of SSAs’ mispricing indicators are optimistically biased 
on average, such an average bias has no effect on the interpretation of our empirical results. This is because our 
empirical specification is based on the association between the change of institutional ownership and relative 
magnitude of SSAs’ mispricing indicators.  
 
The descriptive statistics of control variables are as follows. The mean value (standard deviation) of SIZE, YIELD, 
LEVERAGE, VOLUME, and lagRET12 are 1,915 billion Korean Won (3,091 billion), 0.020 (0.016), 0.439 (0.171), 
0.008 (0.006), and 0.413 (0.645), respectively. The mean value (standard deviation) of the remaining control variables, 
which are frequently used as risk proxies, BETA, IDRISK, OIVOL, B/M, and D/M are 0.982 (0.354), 0.018 (0.011), 
0.028 (0.019), 1.251 (0.902), and 1.259 (1.335), respectively.  
 
Table 1 presents the distributions of main variables used in this study. ∆INSTIT is a change in institutional ownership for 
a year after the SSAs’ information is disclosed at the beginning of year; VRIVC/P are the equity value estimates, which 
is inferred from RIVC model, scaled by stock price, at the beginning of the year; VRIVI/P are the equity value estimates, 
which is inferred from RIVI model, scaled by stock price, at the beginning of the year. See the main text for the details 
of the implementation of each valuation model; VAVER/P is the average of VRIVC/P and VRIVI/P; TARGET is the SSAs’ 
target price divided by the stock price at the beginning of year; RECOM is the SSAs’ stock recommendation at the 
beginning of year (1 = Strong Sell, 2 = Sell, 3 = Hold, 4 = Buy, and 5 = Strong Buy); SIZE is the market value of 
equity at the beginning of year (Billion KRW); BETA is the systematic risk estimated by regressing 30 prior monthly 
stock return and up to 60 prior monthly returns against the corresponding market index; IDRISK is the idiosyncratic 
risk, measured as the variance of residuals from the regressions of BETA estimation; OIVOL is the standard deviation 
of operating income during the past two to five years, scaled by average total asset; B/M is the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity; D/M is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity; YIELD is the dividend 
per share divided by stock price at the beginning of year; LEVERAGE is total liability divided by total assets; VOLUME 
is the average of the ratio of daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding; lagRET12 is the stock 
return of each firm during the previous year; Although we use the logarithmic values of SIZE, B/M, and D/M in subsequent 
main analyses, we present the distributions of the raw values of these variables for a descriptive purpose.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. dev. 5% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95% No. of observations 
∆INSTIT 0.005 0.068 -0.123 -0.087 -0.037 0.002 0.046 0.098 0.138 1,421 
VRIVC/P 1.571 0.849 0.521 0.635 0.911 1.350 2.040 2.914 3.554 1,421 
VRIVI/P 2.113 1.628 0.499 0.641 0.954 1.556 2.662 4.809 6.440 1,421 
VAVER/P 1.854 1.202 0.527 0.652 0.966 1.470 2.331 3.862 4.865 1,421 
TARGET 1.209 0.195 0.907 0.965 1.063 1.185 1.322 1.490 1.617 1,421 
RECOM 3.701 0.320 3.000 3.170 3.500 3.800 4.000 4.000 4.000 1,421 
SIZE 1,915 3,091 45 67 161 477 2,010 6,232 11,580 1,421 
BETA 0.982 0.354 0.369 0.507 0.728 0.953 1.221 1.509 1.672 1,421 
IDRISK 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.046 1,421 
OIVOL 0.028 0.019 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.023 0.037 0.058 0.072 1,421 
B/M 1.251 0.902 0.270 0.366 0.572 0.964 1.637 2.765 3.521 1,421 
D/M 1.259 1.335 0.112 0.168 0.335 0.710 1.647 3.446 4.946 1,421 
YIELD 0.020 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.016 0.029 0.045 0.058 1,421 
LEVERAGE 0.439 0.171 0.147 0.186 0.303 0.451 0.575 0.669 0.718 1,421 
VOLUME 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.018 0.024 1,421 
lagRET12 0.413 0.645 -0.416 -0.259 -0.043 0.256 0.744 1.449 1.947 1,421 
 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between key variables. The association between the change of 
institutional investors’ ownership (∆INSTIT) and the level of V/P ratios (VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, and VAVER/P) and target price 
(TARGET) is significantly positive at the 1% significance level. This result indicates that institutional investors 
incorporate such SSAs’ information more rapidly than individual investors. The correlations among analysts’ 
information are consistent with previous research (Cha & Yoo 2010). For example, there are significantly positive 
correlations among the V/P ratios (VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, and VAVER/P), ranging from 0.786 to 0.971. The associations 
between target price (TARGET) and V/P ratios are also significant and range from 0.093 to 0.270. The correlation 
between target price (TARGET) and stock recommendation (RECOM) is also significantly positive (0.309). Lastly, 
unreported results indicate that there are significantly positive associations between V/P ratios and one-year-ahead 
stock returns, which range from 0.228 to 0.299. This result indicates that V/P ratios incorporating SSAs’ earnings 
forecasts can be considered as the indicator of stock market’s mispricing based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts. The 
significant correlations between the change of institutional investors’ ownership (∆INSTIT) and control variables and 
also between SSAs’ mispricing indicators (VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, VAVER/P, TARGET, RECOM) and control variables indicate 
that we need to examine the results of multivariate analyses, which are presented in next section.  
 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlations between key variables for the pooled sample. Please see the note of Table 1 for 
the definitions of variables except followings. lnSIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. lnB/M is the 
natural log of ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. lnD/M is the natural log of ratio of book value 
of debt to market value of equity. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
or better. 
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Table 2. Pair-Wise Correlations Between Key Variables 
 ∆INSTIT VRIVC/P VRIVI/P VAVER/P TARGET RECOM lnSIZE 
VRIVC/P 0.166***       
VRIVI/P 0.125*** 0.786***      
VAVER/P 0.144*** 0.900*** 0.971***     
TARGET 0.074*** 0.270*** 0.093*** 0.162***    
RECOM -0.026 -0.029 -0.122*** -0.094*** 0.309***   
lnSIZE -0.092*** -0.397*** -0.327*** -0.371*** -0.206*** 0.165***  
BETA -0.060** -0.390*** -0.394*** -0.412*** 0.075*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 
IDRISK 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.032 0.066** 0.138*** -0.126*** -0.308*** 
OIVOL 0.058** -0.046** -0.050* -0.054** 0.050* 0.094*** 0.065** 
lnB/M 0.030 0.407*** 0.377*** 0.406*** 0.176*** -0.217*** -0.581*** 
lnD/M 0.005 0.302*** 0.245*** 0.279*** 0.176*** -0.176*** -0.323*** 
YIELD 0.093*** 0.303*** 0.235*** 0.274*** 0.071*** -0.102*** -0.268*** 
LEVERAGE -0.025 0.032 -0.018 0.002 0.067** -0.051* 0.089*** 
VOLUME 0.130*** -0.006 -0.091*** -0.061** 0.143*** -0.055** -0.170*** 
lagRET12 -0.024 -0.153*** -0.090*** -0.120*** -0.197*** 0.280*** 0.097*** 
No. of observations 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 
 
 BETA IDRISK OIVOL lnB/M lnD/M YIELD LEVERAGE VOLUME 
IDRISK 0.272***        
OIVOL 0.119*** 0.124***       
lnB/M -0.044* 0.144*** -0.270***      
lnD/M 0.156*** 0.272*** -0.298*** 0.684***     
YIELD -0.196*** 0.032 -0.136*** 0.412*** 0.243***    
LEVERAGE 0.265*** 0.240*** -0.172*** 0.036 0.730*** -0.053**   
VOLUME 0.344*** 0.405*** 0.142*** 0.045* 0.137*** 0.074*** 0.149***  
lagRET12 0.144*** 0.086*** 0.181*** -0.210*** -0.074*** -0.131*** 0.091*** 0.139*** 
No. of observations 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 
 
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 reports the results of multivariate regressions of the change of institutional ownership on SSAs’ mispricing 
indicators which test our first hypothesis. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the change of institutional ownership is 
positively associated with each of all SSAs’ mispricing indicators, VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, VAVER/P, TARGET, and RECOM. 
The t-statistics range from 2.40 to 4.11. Furthermore, we investigate which mispricing indicators of SSAs among V/P 
ratio, target price and stock recommendation is incrementally incorporated into the institutional investors’ stock 
trading.  
 
Table 3 presents the pooled sample regressions of the change in institutional ownership on the equity value estimates 
inferred from analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by stock prices (V/P ratio), target prices scaled by stock prices, and 
stock recommendations with control variables. See the notes of Table 1 and 2 for the definitions of variables. Adj. R2 
is the adjusted R2 for the regressions. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. The 
regression equations are as follows. 
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Table 3. Regressions of the Change in Institutional Ownership on the SSAs’ Mispricing Indicators 
Panel A. Dependent variable = ∆INSTIT  
∆INSTIT = β0 + β1 VRIVC/P (VRIVI/P, VAVER/P) + β2 TARGET + β3 RECOM+ β4 lnSIZE + β5 YIELD + β6 BETA+ β7 lnB/M + β8 LEVERAGE  
+ β9 VOLUME+ β10 lagRET12 + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies +ε           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. 
Intercept -0.014 -0.35 0.018 0.46 0.026 0.70 0.001 0.03 -0.021 -0.50 
VRIVC/P 0.012*** 4.11         
VRIVI/P   0.004*** 2.74       
VAVER/P     0.002** 2.40     
TARGET        0.024** 2.40   
RECOM         0.018*** 3.01 
lnSIZE  0.000 0.05 -0.000 -0.53 -0.000 -0.60 -0.000 -0.48 -0.001 -0.93 
YIELD 0.061 0.49 0.106 0.86 0.117 0.95 0.106 0.86 0.085 0.69 
BETA 0.006 1.06 0.003 0.54 -0.000 -0.11 -0.004 -0.77 -0.004 -0.79 
lnB/M -0.015*** -4.18 -0.014*** -3.98 -0.013*** -3.66 -0.011*** -3.29 -0.010*** -3.09 
LEVERAGE -0.015 -1.41 -0.012 -1.09 -0.009 -0.87 -0.010 -0.92 -0.005 -0.53 
VOLUME 0.683** 2.17 0.730** 2.31 0.733** 2.32 0.638** 2.01 0.766** 2.42 
lagRET12 -0.002 -0.83 -0.002 -0.67 -0.002 -0.70 -0.001 -0.31 -0.004 -1.30 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.161 0.160 0.160 0.162 
N. 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 
 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents that both V/P ratio and stock recommendation are significantly associated with the change 
of institutional ownership, while the significance of association between target price and the change of institutional 
ownership disappears when all mispricing indicators are considered. This result implies that SSAs’ target price does 
not provide incremental information to institutional investors beyond SSAs’ earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendation.6  
 
 
Panel B. Dependent variable = ∆INSTIT 
 (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. 
Intercept -0.052 -1.18 -0.050 -1.11 -0.047 -1.06 
VRIVC/P 0.010*** 3.14     
VRIVI/P   0.003** 2.30   
VAVER/P     0.002** 2.13 
TARGET  0.003 0.30 0.010 0.91 0.011 1.02 
RECOM 0.011* 1.68 0.014** 2.16 0.015** 2.26 
lnSIZE  -0.000 -0.04 -0.000 -0.40 -0.000 -0.43 
YIELD 0.049 0.40 0.079 0.64 0.086 0.69 
BETA 0.004 0.65 0.001 0.19 -0.002 -0.36 
lnB/M -0.014*** -3.89 -0.013*** -3.73 -0.012*** -3.49 
LEVERAGE -0.013 -1.20 -0.010 -0.97 -0.008 -0.79 
VOLUME 0.717** 2.26 0.751** 2.36 0.752 2.36 
lagRET12 -0.004 -1.18 -0.003 -1.12 -0.004 -1.17 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.168 0.166 0.165 
N. 1,421 1,421 1,421 
  
                                                             
6 Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) and Bradshaw et al. (2013) consider the change of SSAs’ target price or stock recommendation as the SSAs’ mispricing 
indicator. Following these studies, we regress the change in institutional ownership on the change of SSAs’ mispricing indicators (∆VRIVC/P, ∆VRIVI/P, 
∆VAVER/P, ∆TARGET, and ∆RECOM) as a robustness check. Untabulated results indicate that the change of institutional ownership is positively 
associated with the change of V/P ratio and the change of stock recommendation, which is consistent with our main results. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2018 Volume 34, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 466 The Clute Institute 
In sum, our main empirical results in Table 3 indicate that there is a positive association between the change of 
institutional ownership and SSAs’ mispricing indicator, such as V/P ratio and stock recommendation. This result is 
consistent with our first hypothesis that institutional investors incorporate SSAs’ indicators of stock market’s 
mispricing more actively than individual investors taking a role to enhance the extent of stock market efficiency.  
 
In previous analysis, we regress the change of institutional ownership during a year on the level of SSAs’ mispricing 
indicator at the beginning of that year. Thus, there is less possibility that unknown common factors affect 
simultaneously both the change of institutional ownership and SSAs’ mispricing indicator. However, we cannot fully 
rule out such a possibility. Thus, to strengthen the causal relationship between the change of institutional ownership 
and SSAs’ mispricing indicators, we examine whether institutional investors’ stock trading affects SSAs’ mispricing 
indicators as an alternative hypothesis for the association between the change of institutional ownership and SSAs’ 
mispricing indicators. More specifically, we regress the change of SSAs’ mispricing indicators during a year on the 
previous year’s change of institutional ownership. If we don’t observe a significant association between those two 
variables, we can, at least partially, address such a potential causality issue.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of empirical analysis to examine such an alternative hypothesis. As presented in Table 4, 
the association between the change of SSAs’ mispricing indicators (∆ VRIVC/P, ∆VRIVI/P, ∆VAVER/P, ∆TARGET, 
∆RECOM) and the previous year’s change of institutional ownership is not statistically significant. That is, we cannot 
find any evidence that SSAs’ information is affected by institutional investors’ trading behavior. Therefore, we suggest 
that our main results may support the causality relationship in which institutional investors incorporate SSAs’ guidance 
on their stock trading, but not vice versa. 
 
Table 4 presents the pooled sample regressions of the change of sell-side analysts’ mispricing indicators, such as the 
equity value estimates inferred from analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by stock prices (V/P ratio), target prices scaled 
by stock prices, and stock recommendations, on the previous year’s change in institutional ownership with control 
variables. See the notes of Table 1 and 2 for the definitions of variables, except lag∆INSTIT which is the change in 
institutional ownership during the previous year. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R2 for the regressions. ***, **, * indicate, 
respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. The regression equations are as follows. 
 
 
Table 4. Regressions of the Change of SSAs’ Mispricing Indicators on the Change in Institutional Ownership 
∆ VRIVC/P (∆VRIVI/P, ∆VAVER/P, ∆TARGET, ∆RECOM) = β0 + β1 lag∆INSTIT + β2 lnSIZE + β3 BETA + β4 IDRISK + β5OIVOL + β6 lnB/M  
+ β7lnD/M+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + ε      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆VRIVC/P ∆VRIVI/P ∆VAVER/P ∆TARGET ∆RECOM 
Variables Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. 
Intercept -1.729*** -5.01 -0.323 -0.65 -4.885*** -3.24 -6.113*** -6.53 0.070 0.91 
VRIVC/P -0.250 -1.16 -0.269 -0.86 1.367 1.32 -0.197 -0.33 0.052 0.99 
VRIVI/P 0.081*** 6.85 0.051*** 2.98 0.208*** 3.99 0.218*** 6.74 -0.002 -0.83 
VAVER/P -0.344*** -6.68 -0.589*** -7.93 -0.671*** -2.91 -0.195 -1.39 0.000 0.05 
TARGET  2.154 1.18 1.373 0.52 11.952 1.40 5.094 1.03 0.722* 1.66 
RECOM 1.627* 1.87 -0.152 -0.12 -4.235 -1.06 0.358 0.15 0.201 0.99 
lnSIZE  0.114*** 3.87 0.088** 2.07 0.130 0.98 0.122 1.52 0.002 0.42 
YIELD 0.004 0.28 0.010 0.44 0.009 0.13 0.024 0.55 0.001 0.35 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.264 0.430 0.077 0.180 0.074 
N. 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 
 
 
To test our second hypothesis, we divide the whole sample into two sub-samples on the basis of the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. We measure the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts by their forecast errors, which 
are the absolute value of one-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecasts minus the actual earnings, scaled by stock price. 
Then, we identify two sub-samples with analysts’ forecast errors which is less or more than the median of forecast 
errors in the whole sample (0.029). Then, we repeat our regression analysis in Table 3 separately for each of sub-
sample.  
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Panel A of Table 5 presents the regression results for the first sub-sample with analysts’ earnings forecast errors less 
than the median. As reported in Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient of VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, VAVER/P, and RECOM are 
significantly positive. This result implies that institutional investors incorporate SSAs’ mispricing indicators, such as 
V/P ratio and stock recommendation, more rapidly than individual investors when analysts provide more accurate 
earnings forecasts.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of regressions of the change in institutional ownership on the equity value estimates 
inferred from analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by stock prices (V/P ratio), target prices scaled by stock prices, and 
stock recommendations with control variables for each sub-sample based on analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. Panel 
A presents the results for the first sub-sample with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors less than the median of the whole 
sample. Panel B report the results for the second sub-sample with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors more than the 
median of the whole sample. See the notes of Table 1 and 2 for the definitions of variables. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R2 
for the regressions. ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. The regression 
equations are as follows. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the regression results for the second sub-sample with analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
more than the median. As reported in Panel B of Table 5, the coefficient of VRIVC/P, VRIVI/P, VAVER/P, and TARGET 
are not statistically significant, while only the coefficient of RECOM is weakly significant at the 10% level. This result 
suggests that institutional investors may not actively incorporate the mispricing indicators of analysts who have issued 
less accurate earnings forecasts.  
 
 
Table 5. Regressions of the Change in Institutional Ownership on the SSAs’ Mispricing Indicators for the Sub-Samples based on 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors 
Panel A. Dependent variable = ∆INSTIT  
∆INSTIT = β0 + β1 VRIVC/P (VRIVI/P, VAVER/P) + β2 TARGET + β3 RECOM + β4 lnSIZE + β5 YIELD + β6 BETA+ β7 lnB/M + β8 LEVERAGE  
+ β9 VOLUME+ β10 lagRET12 + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies +ε           
Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Error < Median Value (0.029) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. 
Intercept -0.008 -0.12 0.046 0.74 -0.010 -0.82 0.083 1.24 0.026 0.39 
VRIVC/P 0.018*** 3.67         
VRIVI/P   0.007*** 2.90       
VAVER/P     0.003* 1.78     
TARGET        0.008 0.50   
RECOM         0.021** 2.27 
lnSIZE  -0.001 -0.72 -0.003 -1.49 -0.000 -0.42 -0.004* -1.87 -0.004** -2.12 
YIELD 0.248 1.14 0.340 1.55 0.315 1.63 0.268 1.21 0.231 1.05 
BETA 0.011 1.15 0.007 0.80 -0.002 -0.26 -0.003 -0.42 -0.004 -0.53 
lnB/M -0.013** -2.32 -0.014** -2.39 -0.006 -1.29 -0.008 -1.50 -0.007 -1.22 
LEVERAGE -0.024 -1.30 -0.021 -1.13 -0.013 -0.87 -0.015 -0.83 -0.015 -0.82 
VOLUME 1.221** 2.34 1.238** 2.36 1.244*** 2.62 1.192** 2.25 1.272** 2.42 
lagRET12 -0.001 -0.26 -0.000 -0.03 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.08 -0.002 -0.51 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.213 0.207 0.173 0.197 0.203 
N. 710 710 710 710 710 
(Table 5, Pane B continued on next page) 
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(Table 5 continued) 
Panel B. Dependent variable = ∆INSTIT  
Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Error < Median Value (0.029)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. 
Intercept -0.031 -0.46 -0.013 -0.20 -0.018 -0.28 -0.048 -0.68 -0.061 -0.84 
VRIVC/P 0.005 1.30         
VRIVI/P   0.001 0.62       
VAVER/P     0.002 1.25     
TARGET        0.021 1.53   
RECOM         0.015* 1.73 
lnSIZE  0.000 0.12 -0.000 -0.06 -0.000 -0.01 0.000 0.08 -0.000 -0.19 
YIELD -0.065 -0.38 -0.051 -0.29 -0.050 -0.29 -0.045 -0.26 -0.074 -0.43 
BETA 0.003 0.32 0.000 0.08 0.001 0.12 -0.002 -0.22 -0.001 -0.15 
lnB/M -0.023*** -4.04 -0.023*** -3.96 -0.023*** -4.01 -0.022*** -3.87 -0.021*** -3.76 
LEVERAGE -0.004 -0.23 -0.003 -0.16 -0.003 -0.17 -0.003 -0.18 0.001 0.06 
VOLUME 0.668 1.46 0.692 1.52 0.690 1.51 0.651 1.43 0.756* 1.65 
lagRET12 -0.008* -1.70 -0.008* -1.70 -0.008* -1.72 -0.007 -1.49 -0.010** -2.07 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.217 0.216 0.217 0.218 0.219 
N. 711 711 711 711 711 
 
 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 indicate that the change of institutional ownership is significantly associated 
with SSAs’ mispricing indicators only when analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate, which is consistent with 
our second hypothesis. These results imply that institutional investors selectively incorporate more accurate SSAs’ 
information into their stock trading. Thus, we can suggest that institutional investors may act as a more sophisticated 
mechanism to enhance stock market efficiency by distinguishing the quality of SSAs’ information.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines how institutional investors interact with sell-side analysts (hereafter, SSAs) in Korean stock 
market. We investigate the role of institutional investors as more sophisticated investors who incorporates sell-side 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, target prices and stock recommendation more actively than individual investors do. 
Furthermore, we examine whether institutional investors can differentiate the quality of sell-side analysts’ indicators 
of stock market’s mispricing.  
 
By using a sample of Korean firms during 2001–2011, we find that the change of institutional ownership has a 
significantly positive association with the level of equity value estimates based on SSAs’ earnings forecasts relative 
to stock prices and their stock recommendation. Furthermore, we find that only when SSAs’ earnings forecasts are 
more accurate, institutional investors incorporate SSA’s information into their stock trading. Thus, we conclude that 
institutional investors in Korean stock market may contribute to the enhancement of stock market efficiency by 
incorporating SSAs’ mispricing indicators more actively than individual investors.  
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature as follows. First, this study provides a piece of evidence that 
institutional investors act as a more sophisticated mechanism in incorporating SSAs’ mispricing indicators more 
rapidly than individual investors do. Second, this study suggests that institutional investors can selectively incorporate 
more accurate SSAs’ information. This evidence adds to the prior literature which examines institutional investors’ 
sophistication in stock market. Overall, this study contributes to the enhancement of our knowledge about the 
unobserved interaction among more sophisticated stock market participants who are considered to take an active role 
on the enhancement of stock market efficiency.  
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